In Defense of Modern Legal Positivism by Mirfield, Peter
Florida State University Law Review
Volume 16 | Issue 4 Article 15
Spring 1989
In Defense of Modern Legal Positivism
Peter Mirfield
Florida State University College of Law
Follow this and additional works at: http://ir.law.fsu.edu/lr
Part of the Jurisprudence Commons, and the Legal Education Commons
This Essay is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Florida State University Law
Review by an authorized editor of Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact bkaplan@law.fsu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Peter Mirfield, In Defense of Modern Legal Positivism, 16 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 985 (2017) .
http://ir.law.fsu.edu/lr/vol16/iss4/15
BOOK ESSAY
IN DEFENSE OF MODERN LEGAL POSITIVISM
PETER MIRFIELD*
Professor Mirfield uses the example of a recent casebook to show
that the process of excerpting passages from various writings about
jurisprudence as a method of introducing the study of jurisprudence
has very grave dangers attached to it. These dangers are
demonstrated by "The World of Rules: The Jurisprudence of
Positivism," a chapter of W. Michael Reisman and Aaron M.
Schreiber's Jurisprudence: Understanding and Shaping Law.
Professor Mirfield contends that Reisman and Schreiber's
presentation of positivism is incomplete and is, in places, framed
with inaccurate summaries and characterizations.
O NE MAY, perhaps, be unconvinced of the merits of studying dis-
crete legal subjects via the medium of extracts from cases, arti-
cles and the rest. Linking commentary from casebook editors seems
more often to reveal their idiosyncracies than to lead the student
reader to fruitful enquiry. But, this may be a cry from a legal tradi-
tion rather different from that of the United States. These may be
matters upon which reasonable people, lawyers even, may properly
differ. I would be somewhat more resolute in denying the value of the
"bleeding chunk" approach to "jurisprudence," whatever vastly
varying material may lie between the covers of volumes bearing that
title. Acquaintanceship with the recently published work, Jurispru-
dence: Understanding and Shaping Law: Cases, Readings, Commen-
tary,' written and edited by Professors W. Michael Reisman2 and
* Tutor and Fellow in Law, Jesus College, Oxford; former Visiting Professor of Law,
Florida State University, 1987-1988. B.A., 1971; B.C.L., 1972; M.A., 1976, Oxford University.
1. W. REISMAN & A. SCHREIBER, JURISPRUDENCE: UNDERSTANDING AND SHAPING LAW:
CASES, READINGS, COMMENTARY (1987).
2. Wesley Newcomb Hofeld Professor of Jurisprudence, Yale Law School. L.L.B., 1963,
Hebrew University; L.L.M., 1964; J.S.D., 1965, Yale University.
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Aaron M. Schreiber,3 has done nothing to persuade me away from my
prejudice. The reasons will appear in due course.
I ought, in fairness, to reveal another feature of my philosophy of
the study of law before going any further. I can think of almost noth-
ing with which I more profoundly disagree than the following senti-
ment expressed by the editors near the beginning of their book and
repeated, in different terms, at times later therein:
Legal theory or jurisprudence is of importance only if it contributes
to problem-solving for our profession and society. If it does not,
there is no reason why it should be incorporated in the law school
curriculum and distract the attention of those preparing to serve their
communities and fellow citizens from matters of real importance. 4
I confess distaste for the notion that lawyers "serve" their communi-
ties and fellow citizens; the word smacks too much of ordination and
calling for me. I think it safer to regard the generally rather mundane
life led by the average legal practitioner as being closer to the job of a
plumber than the office of a priest. However, the substance of what
the editors are saying is far more significant than the way in which it
is expressed.
It seems to me that what separates law from other intellectual disci-
plines is far less important than what it shares with them. A good
lawyer is not to be confused with a good legal practitioner, though the
former will, I hope and believe, tend to become the latter should he or
she choose to enter practice. I am almost tempted to say that the value
of legal theory lies precisely in the fact that it has no practical utility.
Certainly its value does not lie in its capacity to prepare students for
the practice of law, even practice at the problem-solving level. Rather,
its value lies in that which it shares with, for example, theories of his-
tory or literary criticism, namely its capacity to advance one's under-
standing of the intellectual discipline which is its subject.
Having regard to Reisman and Schreiber's attitudq to legal theory,
it is not surprising that the branch of legal theory known as "positiv-
ism" comes in for rough treatment. Of Hans Kelsen's 5 Pure Theory of
Law,6 they say that it "almost seems to have been designed for the
bureaucratic universe .. . . [I]t would appear to be amoral and an-
3. Professor of Law, Pace University Law School. B.B.A., 1950, City University of New
York; J.D., 1955, Brooklyn Law School; L.L.M., 1967; J.S.D., 1978, Yale University.
4. W. R IdAN & A. ScImEIBER, supra note 1, at 11.
5. (1881-1973). An Austrian, Kelsen drafted the 1920 Austrian Constitution and served on
the Austrian Supreme Constitutional Court before emigrating.
6. H. KELSEN, PuRE THEORY OF LAw (1967).
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ethical, primarily concerned with understanding and providing guide-
lines for behavior in complex organizations." '7 Certainly, the theory is
"amoral and an-ethical," for these are aspects of its purity. But, it is
hard to see how Kelsen's theory can be said to have been concerned
with understanding behavior, and for precisely the same reason. Were
Kelsen concerned with this, he would be engaged in sociological juris-
prudence, and would thus be compromising the purity of the exercise.'
And, it is surely clear beyond a peradventure that Kelsen's theory was
not concerned with providing guidelines for human behavior. His sci-
ence of law was intended to be entirely descriptive, albeit that the ob-
ject of its description was a system of legal norms which are
themselves prescriptive in nature and form. As he said in Pure Theory
of Law, "the science of law can only describe the law, it cannot
prescribe a certain behavior like the law created by the legal authority
(in the form of general or individual norms)." 9
It is true, as the editors, Reisman and Schreiber, point out, that
some judges have purported to use the "Pure Theory" as providing
them with justification for recognizing a revolution as having been le-
gally successful.' 0 However, this use has been subjected to cogent and
convincing criticism precisely because it treats as prescriptive a theory
which is itself entirely descriptive. 1 It is right to add that James
Harris 2 has suggested that things may not be as straightforward as
this, and that the theory properly has "indirect social suggestive force
for judges."' 3 But, that is very far from a claim that this is the pri-
mary concern of the theory, and Reisman and Schreiber do not, in
any event, rely either explicitly or implicitly upon Harris's argument.
In other words, it is one thing to argue that an unwelcome (for Kel-
sen) but logically necessary feature of the theory is that it does speak
to judges and other bureaucrats, quite another to argue that this was
his theory's major point or purpose.
This misleading assessment of Kelsen is no more than a sideswipe,
for it is at the Anglo-Saxon version of positivism that the attack is
7. W. REISMAN & A. SCHREIBER, supra note 1, at 381.
8. See generally H. KELSEN, GE ERAL THEORY OF LAw AND STATE 162-64 (1961); H. KEL-
SEN, PuRE THEORY OF LAW 1 (1967).
9. H. KELSEN, PuRE THEORY OF LAW 73 (1967) (emphasis in original).
10. The leading example is Madzimbamuto v. Lardner-Burke [19681 2 S. Afr. 284. See also
State v. Dosso [1958] 2 Pak. Sup. Ct. Rep. 180; Uganda v. Comm'r of Prisons [1966] E. Afr.
514, 535-39.
11. See Hopton, Grundnorm and Constitution, 24 McGILL L.J. 72, 83-86 (1978). See also
Brookfield, The Courts, Kelsen, and the Rhodesian Revolution, 19 U. TOR. L.J. 326, 342-44,
351-52 (1969).
12. Tutorial Fellow, Keble College, Oxford. B.C.L., 1966; M.A., 1966, Oxford University;
Ph.D., 1973, London University.
13. Harris, When and Why Does the Grundnorm Change?, 29 CAMB. L.J. 103, 125 (1971).
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substantially directed. Chapter Seven, "The World of Rules: The Ju-
risprudence of Positivism,"' 4 deals with what is now often called
Hartian positivism. That said, I am not sure that Professor H.L.A.
Hart'5 would recognize much of what is contained in the commentary
in that chapter as based upon an accurate picture of his published
views. If this caricature image of modern positivism represents the
view of that doctrine held by the academic lawyer in the United
States, it is small wonder that it seems to have little support here, at
least in the law schools. Let me describe what I understand to be
Hart's own doctrine of legal positivism before I go on to explain what
is wrong with Reisman and Schreiber's treatment of that doctrine. 16
First, Hart stresses that law has social sources. In general, law is
laid down by human beings for other human beings (hence, it is pos-
ited), but, even where this is not the case, law has a social source,
"being entirely rooted in the actual practices (doings, sayings and
thinkings) of persons in society.' 1 7 In particular, the rule of
recognition 8 of any given legal system operates as a social rule requir-
ing judges and officials of that system to recognize as law rules made
in accordance with its requirements. There is, therefore, a "pedigree"
test of the validity of (alleged) legal rules. Secondly, Hart, like Jeremy
14. W. RErsMAN & A. SCHREIBER, supra note 1, at 269-312.
15. Herbert Lionel Adolphus Hart's principal works include: H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT
OF LAW (1961) [hereinafter CONCEPT OF LAW]; Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and
Morals, 71 HARv. L. REv. 593 (1958) [hereinafter Positivism and Separation]; H.L.A. HART,
ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY (1983); H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSI-
BiLITY (1968); H.L.A. HART, LAW, LIBERTY AND MORALITY (1963).
16. What follows is no more than a thumbnail sketch. This is not the place for an extended
discussion of the major features of and problem with that doctrine. For such a discussion, see N.
MACCORMICK, H.L.A. HART (1981).
17. Id. at 159.
18. See CONCEPT OF LAW, supra note 15, at 66-67, 92-120.
[A rule of recognition] will specify some feature or features possession of which by a
suggested rule is taken as a conclusive affirmative indication that it is a rule of the
group to be supported by the social pressure it exerts. The existence of such a rule of
recognition may take any of a huge variety of forms, simple or complex. It may, as in
the early law of many societies, be no more than that an authoritative list or text of
the rules is to be found in a written document or carved on some public monu-
ment .....
In a developed legal system the rules of recognition are of course more complex;
instead of identifying rules exclusively be reference to a text or list they do so by
reference to some general characteristic possessed by the primary rules. This may be
the fact of their having been enacted by a specific body, or their long customary prac-
tice, or their relation to judicial decisions.
Id. at 92.
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Bentham 19 and John Austin 20 before him, denies that there is a con-
ceptual overlap between law and morality;21 the legal validity of a rule
is one thing, its moral value another. This is not to say that morality
does not influence the formation of particular laws, nor that there is
no overlap, so far as subject-matter is concerned, between law and
morality. 22 Thirdly, Hart emphasizes that rules are the basic material
of law. 23 This is not the appropriate place to discuss whether Hart
leaves room for the operation of nonrule standards such as principles,
policies and analogies, nor whether, if he does not, his theory can or
should be adapted to cater for them.24 Finally, Hart argues that, be-
cause rules have a core of certainty as well as a penumbra of doubt,
"the life of the law consists to a very large extent in the guidance both
of officials and private individuals by determinate rules which, unlike
the applications of variable standards, do not require from them a
fresh judgment from case to case." ' 25 Nonetheless, in what Professor
Ronald Dworkin 26 describes as "hard cases, ' 27 that is, cases in which
no rule of law clearly governs, it can be argued that the courts per-
form a rule-producing, rather than a rule-applying, function. The
problem which surfaces again here is whether, in such cases, the rule
produced is generated by an exercise of strong discretion unbound by
any legal standard whatsoever, or whether judges are under an obliga-
19. (1748-1832). A prolific writer with a great variety of interests, Bentham, the originator
of utilitarianism, was educated in law and published widely in the field of law and morals. J.
BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCl'LES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION (1789), expounds
his theory of the principle of utility. He was active as a legal and social reformer.
20. (1790-1859). Fellow utilitarian and friend of Bentham, Austin taught Jurisprudence at
University College, London. His major work, J. AUSTIN, TIE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DE-
TERMINED (1832), is a product of those lectures.
21. CONCEPT OF LAW, supra note 15, at 181-89, 203-07.
22. Id. at 199-200.
23. For a discussion of Hart's important distinction between primary and secondary rules,
see N. MACCORMICK, supra note 16, at 92-120.
24. The literature on this question is voluminous. The criticism that Hart's theory failed to
provide for principles was made first in Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 35 U. Cm. L. REv. 14
(1967). This, Dworkin's seminal article, has been widely reprinted. E.g. R. DWORKIN, The
Model of Rules 1, in TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 14 (1977); Dworkin, Is Law a System of Rules?,
in THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 38 (R. Dworkin ed. 1977) (here a modified version of the article is
presented); Dworkin, Is Law a System of Rules, in ESSAYS IN LEGAL PiLosoPHY 25 (R. Summers
ed. 1968). A number of authors have replied to Dworkin's criticism. E.g., Raz, Legal Principles
and the Limits of Law, 81 YALE L.J. 823 (1972); N. MACCORmICK, LEGAL REASONING AND LE-
GAL THEORY 229-58 (1978); Waluchow, Herculean Positivism, 5 Ox. J. LEGAL STUD. 187 (1985).
25. CONCEPT OF LAW, supra note 15, at 132.
26. Professor of Law, New York University School of Law; Professor of Jurisprudence &
Fellow, University College, Oxford. A.B., 1953, Harvard University; B.A., 1955, Oxford Uni-
versity; LL.B., 1957, Harvard University.
27. Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 35 U. Cm. L. REV. 14, 45 (1967).
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tion to use nonrule standards in the process, or whether the process is
sometimes of the former kind and sometimes of the latter.
Reisman and Schreiber's seventh chapter, "The World of Rules:
The Jurisprudence of Positivism," begins, in dramatic style, with a
suggestion that the reader imagine himself a judge in Nazi Germany,
sworn, by virtue of his office, to uphold viciously racist laws. 28 It
moves quickly to the trial of Billy Budd and Captain Vere's defense of
application of the strict letter of the law in Budd's case. 29 The editors
then say, "Captain Vere stated a central thesis of positivism, the ethic
of obedience to the rules-no matter what." ' 30 The editors go on to
say:
The audience to whom the order is directed, is expected to ignore any
inconsistency between the content of the order and its own morality.
The dissonance that is thus established between law and morality has
created many ethical problems for the positivist. This 'separation' of
law and morality is another leitmotif of positivism and is explored in
the next chapter.31
It seems to me that the student reading this book and coming across
legal positivism for the first time is likely to be thoroughly prejudiced
against it from the start. The effect of these early paragraphs is that
positivists are moral monsters, sworn to unthinking adherence to
rules, no matter how unjust or even brutal. No doubt the editors did
not intend to smear positivism with the allegation that it was, in some
part, a contributing factor to the success of Nazism, but one might be
forgiven for getting that impression. Any such allegation is as plausi-
ble as blaming Richard Wagner's music for Nazism or homosexuals
for the downfall of Rome.
Now, it is true that Hart, like Bentham and Austin before him, in-
sists upon the value of separating law from morality.3 2 So, in the con-
text of a functioning legal order, judges have a legal obligation to
recognize as rules of law all rules that satisfy the criteria laid down by
the rule of recognition, 33 while ordinary citizens have a legal obliga-
tion to obey such of those rules as are duty-imposing in nature.34
However, the legal "ethic" of obedience must be placed in its proper
28. W. REtsMAN & A. SCHREIBER, supra note 1, at 269.
29. Id. (quoting H. MELVILLE, BILLY BUDD 244-46 (F. Freeman ed. 1948)).
30. Id. (citing R. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED (1975)).
31. Id. at 269-70. One wonders if use of the word "leitmotif," associated with the music
dramas of Richard Wagner, is coincidental.
32. CONCEPT OF LAW, supra note 15, at 203-07.
33. Id. at 112-14.
34. Id. at 113.
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context. Hart has been assiduous in stressing the limited importance
of legal validity." The presence of legal obligation is not, by any
means, conclusive of questions of moral obligation. Reisman and
Schreiber are fully aware of this point for, in the next chapter, they
quote the following words of Hart: "If with the Utilitarians we speak
plainly, we say that laws may be law but too evil to be obeyed. This is
a moral condemnation which everyone can understand and it makes
an immediate and obvious claim to moral attention." 3 6
In truth, the "evil law" presents an ethical problem for all legal
theorists, natural lawyers, realists and the rest no less than positivists;
that problem is in no sense the "creation" of the positivists. It would
have assisted the reader's ability to think carefully and conscientiously
about Hart's answer to that problem had the preceding passage been
presented in full at the outset, rather than being held back for the
middle of the following chapter. This is especially so having regard to
the fact that the Preface invites teachers to be selective in the sections
they assign to their classes.17
A second shortcoming of Reisman and Schreiber's analysis is also
revealed by the very first page of "The World of Rules." The editors
say that "Positivism . . .is a jurisprudence which conceives of law as
the order, in the form of a rule, of a political superior to a political
inferior." ' 3 The notion of law as orders of this kind is reasonably and
properly attributable to both Austin and Bentham, 39 though the lat-
ter's theory of law was more complex and subtle than the former's/'4
But this is not Hart's view of law, and it is hard to believe that it is the
view of any other modern positivist, either. So far as Hart is con-
cerned, three chapters of The Concept of Law41 are largely an attempt
to refute the notion of the political sovereign barking out orders to his
subjects. This is not the place to discuss in any detail Hart's reasons
for rejecting it, but one point should be made. For Hart, it is, in a
35. Id. at 68, 97-107, 195-207.
36. W. REISMAN & A. SCHREIBER, supra note 1, at 335 (quoting Positivism and Separation,
supra note 15, at 620). See also CONCEPT OF LAW, supra note 15, at 203-07.
37. W. REisMAN & A. SCHREIBER, supra note 1, at xiii-xiv.
38. Id. at 269.
39. Austin uses the term "command" rather than "order." See J. AuSTN, THE PROVINCE
OF JUISPRUDENCE DETERMINED 5 (n.p. 2d ed. 1861 & photo. reprint 1970). Bentham preferred
"mandate" to both "command" and "order." J. BENTHAM, OF LAWS IN GENERAL 10-15
(H.L.A. Hart ed. 1970) (from a manuscript originally published posthumously as J. BENTHAM,
THE LIMITS OF JURISPRUDENCE DEFINED (C. Everett ed. 1945)) (Hart indicates, at xxxi, that the
text was "substantially completed in 1782."). On the notion that law is laid down by a superior
to an inferior, see J. AUSTIN, supra at 15, 170-91, and J. BENTHAM, supra at 1, 18.
40. See H.L.A. HART, ESSAYS ON BENTHAMpassim (1982).
41. CONCEPT OF LAW, supra note 15, at 18-76.
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sense, the rule of recognition which is sovereign within any given legal
system; the notion of political superiors and inferiors has no part to
play in his theory. 42 It might have been possible to forgive this as a
lapse by Reisman and Schreiber and for them to be taken to be refer-
ring only to the early positivists. However, having quoted at length
from The Concept of Law, 43 they refer later in "The World of Rules"
to "the concept developed by Austin and Hart of law as rules (by
political superiors to political inferiors).""4 Now, it is right to say that
this passage appears in the Notes which follow the editors' extracts
from Hart's book. So, it may be said, these are remarks designed to
stimulate an informed response from students who have read those
extracts, rather than a statement of the editors' own understanding of
Hart. This is hardly a satisfactory reply, for the student who has read
only those extracts is in no position to challenge the remarks as being
inaccurate. It is to elsewhere in Hart's book that one must look, first,
for a repudiation of the simplistic superior/inferior model, 45 and, sec-
ond, for the concept he puts in its place." Yet nothing from either of
these discussions is extracted in the editors' Chapter Seven, "The
World of Rules." It seems that one must conclude that there really is
a basic error here, though it is possible that they have some (unstated)
argument at their fingertips in support of their position. If so, it
would have been interesting to have heard it.
Next, we are asked, "[I]s it accurate to assume-as Positivists do-
that such decisions are objective and simply entail applying a fixed
rule to an objectively definable fact situation before the court? ' 47
Reisman and Schreiber go on to suggest that such a mechanical, some
would say "slot-machine," view of judicial decision making is unten-
able. 48 Quite right: it is untenable. However, this is hardly a stick with
which to beat modern Hartian positivists. Hart himself regards the
process as being anything but objective and simple. The following
passage from The Concept of Law reveals Hart's view that all rules
have, to some degree or other, an "open texture":
42. See, e.g. id. at 49-76.
43. W. REISMtA & A. SCHREIBER, supra note 1, at 282-92.
44. Id. at 293 n.4.
45. CONCEPT OF LAW, supra note 15, at 49-76.
46. Id. at 97-120.
47. W. REISMAN & A. SCHREIBER, supra note 1, at 293 n.6. Again, it is right to point out
that this question appears in the Notes which follow the extracts from The Concept of Law, so
that students might be expected to challenge that assertion. However, once again, they are not
given any of the passages from that book which would enable them to mount such a challenge.
48. Id.
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Even when verbally formulated general rules are used, uncertainties
as to the form of behaviour required by them may break out in
particular concrete cases. Particular fact-situations do not await us
already marked off from each other, and labelled as instances of the
general rule, the application of which is in question; nor can the rule
itself step forward to claim its own instances. In all fields of
experience, not only that of rules, there is a limit, inherent in the
nature of language, to the guidance which general language can
provide.4 9
Nor does Hart consider this to be a bad feature of legal rules. He
says:
In fact all systems in different ways, compromise between two social
needs: the need for certain rules which can, over great areas of
conduct, safely be applied by private individuals to themselves
without fresh official guidance or weighing up of social issues, and
the need to leave open, for later settlement by an informed, official
choice, issues which can only be properly appreciated and settled
when they arise in a concrete case.5 0
Plainly, Hart here acknowledges as both inevitable and sometimes de-
sirable the possibility of practical discretion in making decisions. He
does stress that there is sometimes a tendency to regard too much as
"perennially open or revisable in precedents," 5 1 and that the degree to
which the texture should properly be left open varies with the subject
matter of the legal material in question.52 So, judges exercise their cre-
ative function in the context of a varying level of constraint. 3 None-
theless, Hart would find there to be nothing wrong in principle with
the view that "the decision-maker, a judge or some functional equiva-
lent, must innovate and engage in a process of making choices," '5 4 a
view which Reisman and Schreiber present as contradicting that of the
positivist.
Reisman and Schreiber are aware of Hart's true position, for they
make reference to the "open texture" argument." However, they fail
to present extracts from the part of The Concept of Law in which
Hart explains and develops that argument; the reader is left to deduce
49. CONCEPT OF LAW, supra note 15, at 123.
50. Id. at 127.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. N. MACCORMICK, supra note 24, at 246-55.
54. W. REISMAN & A. SCHREIBER, supra note 1, at 305 n.4.
55. Id.
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from Dworkin's critical treatment of Hart's theory 6 what the latter
had to say. Their view of the effect of the open texture argument
upon Hart's stance seems to be that it demonstrates his "de facto
defection ' 5 7 from positivism; the argument is a "stratagem" to which
Hart is compelled to "resort." 58 At no point is it explained why the
open texture argument may be said to deprive Hart of his positivist
credentials, nor is the reader presented with any counter-explanation.
It is certainly not Dworkin's position that Hart is thus made a defec-
tor. On the contrary, Dworkin argues that the acceptance of the no-
tion that rules have an open texture, together (he alleges) with the
admission that judges exercise strong discretion in hard cases, demon-
strates the inadequacy of positivism as a theory of law.5 9
If Reisman and Schreiber really are claiming that a belief in "slot-
machine" decision-making is a necessary feature of positivism, then it
would seem that the apparent arch-positivist himself, John Austin,
must be excluded from the fold. They refer to Hart's claim that nei-
ther Bentham nor Austin held the view "that a legal system is a
'closed logical system' in which correct legal decisions can be deduced
by logical means from predetermined legal rules without reference to
social aims, policies, or moral standards." 6 Hart supports this argu-
ment by reference to a number of quotations from Austin's works. 6'
One such quote may suffice to suggest the tenor of Austin's position.
Austin castigated the common law judges for causing the system of
equity to develop because they "would not do what they ought to
have done, namely to model their rules of law and of procedure to the
growing exigencies of society, instead of stupidly and sulkily adhering
to the old and barbarous usages."' 62 Hart concludes that "only an en-
tire misconception of what analytical jurisprudence is and why [Aus-
tin] thought it important has led to the view that he, or any other
analyst, believed that the law was a closed logical system in which
judges deduced their decisions from premises." 63
56. Id. at 294-305 (quoting Dworkin, Is Law a System of Rules?, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF
LAW, supra note 24, at 38-40, 42-52, 54-58, 60-65).
57. See W. REIsMAN & A. SCHREaIER, supra note 1, at 305 n.4.
58. See id.
59. Id. at 300-01, 304-05 (quoting Dworkin, Is Law a System of Rules?, in TI PHILOSOPHY
OF LAW, supra note 24, at 53-55, 64-65).
60. Id. at 270 n.* (quoting Positivism and Separation, supra note 15, at 601 n.25).
61. Positivism and Separation, supra note 15, at 609 nn.33-35.
62. J. AUSTIN, Groundless Objections to Judicial Legislation, in 2 LECTURES ON JURISPRU-
DENCE 647 (5th ed. 1885 & photo. reprint 1972), quoted in Positivism and Separation, supra note
15, at 609 n.35.
63. Positivism and Separation, supra note 15, at 608.
MODERN LEGAL POSITIVISM
If Reisman and Schreiber disagree with Hart on this point, it is
surely incumbent upon them to say why and to produce evidence in
support. This they wholly fail to do, thus leading one to conclude that
their view of positivist legal theory is shot through with misunder-
standing and confusion.
They have no more time for, or patience with, "positivist" judges
than they do for "positivist" theorists. The indicted villains here are
Justice Roberts and (more surprisingly) Justice Holmes. 6The positiv-
ist theory of the Supreme Court of the time was, it seems, to blame
for the fact that that Court struck down the early "New Deal" legisla-
tion.65 This theory is said to be best exemplified by the following pas-
sage from Justice Roberts' opinion in United States v. Butler:
There should be no misunderstanding as to the function of this court
in such a case. It is sometimes said that the court assumes a power to
overrule or control the action of the people's representatives. This is
a misconception. The Constitution is the supreme law of the land
ordained and established by the people. All legislation must conform
to the principles it lays down. When an act of Congress is
appropriately challenged in the courts as not conforming to the
constitutional mandate the judicial branch of the Government has
only one duty,-to lay the article of the Constitution which is
invoked beside the statute which is challenged and to decide whether
the latter squares with the former. All the court does, or can do, is to
announce its considered judgment upon the question. The only
power it has, if such it may be called, is the power of judgment. This
court neither approves nor condemns any legislative policy. Its
delicate and difficult office is to ascertain and declare whether the
legislation is in accordance with, or in contravention of, the
provisions of the Constitution; and, having done that, its duty
ends .66
There can be no doubt that Justice Roberts was here espousing a
strict, literalist, even mechanistic, interpretation of the Constitution,
nor that the result was to strike down legislation (the Agricultural Ad-
justment Act 1933) which modem liberals and, probably, many others
of rather different political persuasions would regard as being utterly
reasonable and sensible. However, it should be plain from what has
been said in this Essay that the theory of legal positivism does not
64. See W. REISMrAN & A. SCHREEBER, supra note 1, at 306-11.
65. Id. at 308-09.
66. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 62-63 (1935), quoted in W. REISMAN & A. ScHREI-
BER, supra note 1, at 308.
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entail a theory of the Constitution such as this. One may, perhaps, be
forgiven for quoting once again from Hart:
The vice known to legal theory as formalism or conceptualism
consists in an attitude to verbally formulated rules which both seeks
to disguise and to minimize the need for such choice, once the
general rule has been laid down ....
... In some legal systems at some periods it may be that too much
is sacrificed to certainty, and that judicial interpretation of statutes
or of precedent is too formal and so fails to respond to the
similarities and differences between cases which are visible only when
they are considered in the light of social aims. 67
Justice Roberts may well have been a prey to this vice, but it is wrong
to identify it as a vice of positivism.
Finally, Reisman and Schreiber's criticism of McBoyle v. United
States68 is less than fair. The object of their attack is Justice Holmes,
hardly the most obvious standard-bearer of positivism among Ameri-
can judges. The question in McBoyle was whether the defendant had
been properly convicted of transporting a "motor vehicle" in inter-
state commerce knowing it to have been stolen, the difficulty being
that it had been an airplane which he had taken across state lines. 69
Section 2 of the National Motor Vehicle Theft Act 1919 defined "mo-
tor vehicle" to "include an automobile, automobile truck, automobile
wagon, motor cycle, or any other self-propelled vehicle not designed
for running on rails." ' 70 The key words here were the last ten, which
might be regarded as wide enough to embrace an airplane.
Justice Holmes, speaking for a unanimous Court, saw problems
both of construction and of principle or policy with such an expansive
view of section 2. The problem of construction was that the word "ve-
hicle," he opined, "calls up the picture of a thing moving on land. '71
Hence, the better, first-impression interpretation of the words, "not
designed for running on rails," placed the emphasis more upon "run-
ning" than upon "not designed for . . . rails." An airplane is obvi-
ously not designed for rails, but also cannot, comfortably at least, be
said to "run." Support for such an interpretation would, because of
the shared nature of the express examples of "motor vehicles" given
67. CONCEPT OF LAW, supra note 15, at 126-27.
68. 283 U.S. 25 (1930).
69. Id. at 25.
70. Id. at 26.
71. Id.
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in section 2 as land vehicles, be given by the ejusdem generis rule. Lest
this be thought an unduly textual approach, Justice Holmes referred
to the reports and debates in Congress relating to the Act. Nothing, it
seems, had been said in Congress about airplanes. 72
The argument of principle or policy he expressed eloquently as fol-
lows:
Although it is not likely that a criminal will carefully consider the
text of the law before he murders or steals, it is reasonable that a fair
warning should be given to the world in language that the common
world will understand, of what the law intends to do if a certain line
is passed. To make the warning fair, so far as possible the line
should be clear. When a rule of conduct is laid down in words that
evoke in the common mind only the picture of vehicles moving on
land, the statute should not be extended to aircraft, simply because it
may seem to us that a similar policy applies, or upon the speculation
that, if the legislature had thought of it, very likely broader words
would have been used.73
This is clearly no more than a particular working-out and explanation
of the familiar and well-established idea that criminal statutes should
be construed strictly in favor of the defendant. There is plenty of au-
thority supporting that idea, not least in the Supreme Court itself. 74 It
was argued by one commentator only shortly after the decision in
McBoyle that, since the defendant had clearly committed a crime un-
der state law, there was less to be said for the decision in terms of
fairness than would usually be the case,75 but even he accepted that
"[t]he result [did] not seem improper. '' 7 6 Given these circumstances, it
is baffling to find Reisman and Schreiber giving McBoyle as an exam-
ple of "Positivism's often rigid construction and distortion of the ob-
jectives of legislation." ' 77 They say that rigid construction and
distortion of this type is "sometimes quite ludicrous," though it is not
entirely clear from the context whether they wish to apply that phrase
to Justice Holmes's reasoning in McBoyle or to reserve it for Justice
72. Id.
73. Id. at 27 (citing United States v. Thind, 261 U.S. 204, 209 (1923)).
74. See United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 76, 95 (1820). See also, e.g., Lipa-
rota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419 (1985); United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336 (1971); Rewis v.
United States, 401 U.S. 808 (1971); Bell v. United States, 349 U.S. 81 (1955).
75. Hall, Strict or Liberal Construction of Penal Statutes, 48 HARv. L. REv. 748, 759
(1935).
76. Id. at 758 n.53.
77. W. REis sei & A. SCHREIBER, supra note 1, at 307.
1989]
998 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITYLA WREVIEW [Vol. 16:985
Roberts's infamous opinion in Butler.78 In any event, with or without
the epithet "ludicrous," the criticism seems quite unfair. Justice
Holmes did make reference to the proceedings of Congress in trying
to discover whether the legislation was intended to apply to aircraft.
Furthermore, he relied upon a widely supported principle or policy of
the common law, one which might reasonably be taken to condition
Congressional attitudes to the objectives of the legislation in question.
One is reminded of Professor Lon Fuller's 9 example of the statute
making it punishable by a small fine "to sleep in any railway sta-
tion."0 He gives as one problematical case that of a man who had
brought to the station a blanket and pillow and "had obviously settled
himself down for the night" but who is arrested "before he had a
chance to go to sleep."'8 He indicates, albeit rhetorically, that there
would be nothing amiss about convicting such a man on the basis that
"'sleep' as used in this statute [should be taken] to mean something
like, 'to spread oneself out on a bench or floor to spend the night, or
as if to spend the night.' ",82 It may be thought significant that Fuller
would be prepared to regard as "sleeping," for the purposes of the
statute, a person who he had earlier described as having been arrested
before he had had a chance to go to "sleep." However, perhaps even
Fuller would have jibbed at the idea of applying a definition so con-
trary to the picture evoked in the common mind (and other minds
too?) by the word "sleep" had the offense been one which, as in
McBoyle, had resulted in a sentence of three years in prison and a
$2,000 fine. In any event, there is surely very much more to be said
for Justice Holmes' position than Reisman and Schreiber acknowl-
edge.
It is academically legitimate to attack positivism as a theory of law
for its lack of "realism" or for its limited focus. Reisman and Schrei-
ber themselves make these points in several places.8 3 Whether these
criticisms carry any force and whether, even if they do, it matters very
78. Id. The introductory matter for the section on positivism in American judicial practice
concludes thus: "More puzzling, indeed sometimes quite ludicrous, is Positivism's often rigid
construction and distortion of the objectives of legislation. Consider the following examples."
Id. The selection from McBoyle follows immediately, while the extract from Butler is given next,
after an editorial passage placing that case in the context of the early New Deal. Id. at 308.
79. (1902-1978). Carter Professor of General Jurisprudence, Harvard Law School, 1948-
1972. A.B., 1924; J.D., 1926, Stanford University. His chief work with respect to Hart is L.
FULLER, THE MoRAL"y OF LAW (1964).
80. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law-A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HAv. L. REv.
630, 664 (1958).
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. W. REisMAN & A. SCHREIBER, supra note 1, at 270, 281, 293-94, 306, 310-11.
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much so far as the intellectual appeal of positivism is concerned, is
another matter; my own predilections will probably be clear enough.
However, it will not do to attribute to the positivist legal theorists po-
sitions they clearly did not and do not hold, and then to attack those
positions. Nor does it assist critical thinking to conflate positivism
with mechanical jurisprudence. If the student must read Reisman and
Schreiber's book, let him or her omit "The World of Rules" or, bet-
ter still, read it with The Concept of Law open at his or her elbow.

